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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is subject to reassignment to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Plaintiff/Appellant William R. Rothstein purchased a season ski pass to 
Snowbird Ski Resort, which operates on public land. Salt Lake County ski resorts, 
including Defendant/Appellee Snowbird Corporation, require purchasers of season 
ski passes to sign a Release and Indemnity Agreement releasing the resorts for 
negligence which results in the injury to a patron. In order to obtain a seasons 
pass known as a Seven Summits Pass at Snowbird for the 2002-2003 season, 
Rothstein was required to sign two such Releases.1 On February 3, 2003, 
Rothstein sustained serious, life-threatening injuries (12 broken ribs, a decimated 
right kidney, bruised heart, damaged liver and collapsed lung) when he skied into 
a massive manmade retaining wall (constructed of mine timber cribbing) that had 
been erected on one of Snowbird's ski runs. That retaining wall was snow 
covered and not marked. 
1
 The first Release was to obtain a Snowbird season pass. The second Release 
was required to obtain the Seven Summits Pass that gave Rothstein additional 
skiing privileges such as not waiting in the lift lines. (R. at 175-76.) 
1 
Based upon the Releases that Rothstein had signed, the Honorable Anthony 
Quinn granted summary judgment in favor of Snowbird on Rothstein's 
negligence-based claims. The issues which Rothstein wishes to address on appeal 
are: Whether such Releases are enforceable or otherwise void and against public 
policy (1) as a result of Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-52, et seq, or (2) on the basis of being adhesion contracts? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To determine whether the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment, this Court "review[s] the trial court's order granting summary judgment 
for correctness and accord[s] no difference to the court's legal conclusions. In 
addition, the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brigham Young University v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 110 P.3d 678, 683 (Utah 2005); Alta v. Holden, 44 P.3d 
781, 787 (Utah 2002); Ward v. Intermountain Farmer's Ass 'n, 907 P.2d 264, 266 
(Utah 1995). Enforceability of such Releases is a question of law. Russ v. 
Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1985). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW 
The issue was preserved before the District Court in Snowbird's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. at 170-249, 290-323, 383-399, 413 and 417-418.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
In Russ v. Woodside Homes, 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1985), the Utah 
Court of Appeals discussed the enforceability of such Releases, but not in a 
recreational/adhesion contract context. Neither did the Utah Court of Appeals in 
Russ consider what effect the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Act and the public 
policy it espouses would have upon the enforceability of such Releases. Other 
states, however, with similar Inherent Risk of Skiing statutes, and which promote 
their ski industry in much the same fashion as Utah (i.e. Vermont and Colorado), 
have found such Releases to be void as against public policy. 
Rothstein submits that the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Statute produces the 
same result. And that Statute reads as follows: 
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large 
number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of 
nonresidents, significantly contributing to the economy of this state. 
It further finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide 
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the 
premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in recent 
years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks 
inherent in the sport or skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, 
to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent 
in that sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are 
inherent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public 
policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski 
operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks. 
§78-27-51. 
As used in this act: 
3 
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions 
which are an integral part of the sports of skiing, snowboarding, and 
ski jumping, including, but not limited to: changing weather 
conditions, variation or steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; 
surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest growth, 
rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other skiers, and a skier's 
failure to ski or jump within the skier's own ability. 
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property damage or 
loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose 
of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other types of 
ski jumping; and snowboarding. 
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator 
to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other type of ski jumping, 
and snowboarding. 
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, 
officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area. 
§ 78-27-52. 
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 to 
the contrary, no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, 
any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent 
risks of skiing. 
§ 78-27-53. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent 
locations within each ski area which shall include a list of the 
inherent risks of skiing, and the limitations on liability of ski area 
operators, as defined in this act. 
§ 78-27-54. 
4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case arose out of a serious skiing accident that occurred on February 3, 
2003 when Rothstein struck a snow covered manmade retaining wall that was on 
one of Snowbird's ski runs. The retaining wall was unmarked. Rothstein was a 
season pass holder at Snowbird. Snowbird and all of the other Salt Lake County 
ski resorts require season pass holders to sign exculpatory agreements releasing 
the resorts for injuries incurred by skiers as a result of the resorts' negligence. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Rothstein sued Snowbird on two claims of negligence. (R. at 109.) 
Snowbird moved for summary judgment based upon the exculpatory agreements 
Rothstein had signed. (R. at 172-194.) On January 23, 2006, the District Court 
granted Snowbird's Motion dismissing Rothstein's negligence claims with 
prejudice. (R. at 413, 417-418.) The District Court also granted Rothstein's 
Motion to File an Amended Complaint asserting a claim for gross negligence. (R. 
at 413, 415.) Rothstein thereafter filed his Amended Complaint {R. at 419) and a 
Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
41 (a)(1.) (R. at 426.) On February 16, 2006, Rothstein filed his Notice of 
Appeal. (R. at 428.) 
2
 A copy of that Order is included in the Addendum to this Brief as Exhibit A. 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rothstein was seriously injured on February 3, 2003 while skiing the Fluffy 
Bunny Run at the Snowbird Ski Resort. (R. at 50, 53 and 55 ) Rothstein was 
injured when he collided with a retaining wall constructed of mine cribbing that 
had been erected across the ski run. (R. at 59.) The resulting impact left 
Rothstein with 12 broken ribs, the loss of a kidney, a bruised heart, damaged liver 
and a collapsed lung. (R. at 53.) 
Rothstein testified that the retaining wall was not visible as he skiied down 
upon it. (R. at 59 and 60.) More importantly, Rothstein's testimony is confirmed 
by the photograph which Snowbird personnel took of Rothstein and the accident 
scene immediately afterwards. (R. at 57.) In the record at page 46, is a 
photograph of ski patrolmen working on the injured Rothstein. On this 
photograph, Rothstein drew an arrow showing the approximate route he skied on 
the Fluffy Bunny Run, Taken above the accident scene and looking down on the 
ski run, the retaining wall is completely snow covered and not visible in this 
photograph. (R. at 60.) 
In the record at page 47, is another photograph of the same ski patrolmen 
providing medical care to Rothstein. This photograph is taken from below the 
retaining wall and shows the retaining with which Rothstein collided. (R. at 51-
52.) Copies of the foregoing photographs are included in the Addendum to this 
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Brief as Exhibits B and C, respectively. Other photographs of the retaining wall 
and a DVD of the massive structure taken during the summer following 
Rothstein's accident appear in the record at pages 202, 203 and 390-91. One of 
these photographs of the retaining wall is also included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit D. 
Dean Cardinale is Director of Snow Safety at Snowbird. (R. at 60.) 
Following the accident, Cardinale visited Rothstein while Rothstein was being 
hospitalized for his injuries. In that visit, Cardinale told Rothstein that the 
retaining wall should have been "marked," that it was hazardous and, more 
importantly, that the accident was Snowbird's fault. (R. at 42.) Bradley Sachs is a 
friend of Rothstein's. Sachs is also an attorney. Sachs likewise spoke with 
Cardinale about Rothstein's accident and Cardinale told Sachs that the retaining 
wall should have been marked. (R. at 57.) 
Rothstein is an expert skier. Consequently, during a deposition, 
Snowbird's counsel asked Rothstein what should have been done to make that 
Fluffy Bunny Run safe, Rothstein gave the following answer: 
I think this area should have been completely fenced off until the 
snowpack was such that the object was completely covered and it 
was safe to ski over. 
(R. at 54.) 
Pete Schory is the Head of Ski Patrol. Schory said that the Fluffy Bunny 
Run had been open since 1971. (R. at 51.) Schory also said that the retaining 
wall was constructed by Snowbird in the summer of 1983. (R. at 89.) 
In response to Interrogatories, Snowbird admitted that it has never sold, 
given or provided a season's pass to anyone without requiring the signing of a 
Release Agreement. (R. at 393.) In response to the same Interrogatories, 
Snowbird further admitted that the retaining wall was constructed on land owned 
by the Untied States Forest Service. (Id.) In its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Rothstein's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Snowbird admitted that all the 
other Salt Lake County Utah ski resorts (i.e. Alta, Brighton and Solitude) require 
similar Release and Indemnity Agreements from season pass holders. (R. at 327.) 
In order to obtain a Seven Summits Pass, Rothstein was required to sign 
two Release and Indemnity Agreements. (R. at 185 and 191.) The first agreement 
provided as follows: 
I am aware that "skiing, in its various forms" is a hazardous sport 
involving the risks of injuries and death. In consideration for my use 
of Alta or Snowbird ski areas, I hereby waive all my claims, 
including claims of personal injury, death and property damage 
against Alta or Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to 
assume all risks of personal injury, death and/or property damage 
associated with skiing, snowboarding and/or operating or resulting 
from the fault of Alta, Snowbird, their agents or employees. I agree 
to hold harmless and indemnify Alta and Snowbird, their agents 
and employees, from all my claims, including those caused by 
negligence or other fault of Alta or Snowbird, their agents or 
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employees. I agree that am ; » •<• in.. * <»: nn ^jn^senidiixc^ 
initiate against Alta or Siv^ ' ir agents or employees, should 
be brought exclusively in ^ County. Utah, and that the laws 
of the State of Utah shall go\ cm. 
(R. at 185) (emphasis in original). 
I hi" siui'iitl Riii'iist miiljiiiul til'1 h>ll»^M'in Liiit'iKifJt, 
- nucb\ acknowledge that (he use ol {he ioeku loom luunge. *ki 
mountain and any privilege nr sen ice incident iu m\ membership '" 
Seven Summits Club is taken w iih knowledge of the risks ol 
possible injury. 1 am aware thai skiing and snowboarding in then 
various forms ("Skiing") are hazardous sports involving the risks of 
injuries and death. In consideration of my use of the Snowbird 
Corporation ("Snowbird") ski facility, 1 agree to assume and accept 
all risk of injury to myself and my guests, including the inherent risk 
of skiing, the risks associated with the operation of the ski area and 
the risk caused by the negligence of Snowbird, its employees or 
agents \ release and agree to indemnify Snowbird, all landowners 
of the ski area, and employees and agents from all claims for injuries 
or damages arising out of the operation of the ski area or my 
activities at Snowbird, whether such injuries or damages arise out o. 
the risk of skiing or from any other cause, including the negligence 
of Snowbird, its employees and agents. I agree never n- tie 
Snowbird, its employees or agents on am claim arising mit nf the 
operation of the ski area or my activities at Snowbird. 1 itis 
agreement is hindinp on rm heir: *md assien^. 
(R. at 19 h (rmrhasis in original). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is impoi tantto note that those States (such as Coloi ado and V ei moi it) 
w 1 lich promote tl leii ski ii ldustry consider skiing at ski resorts as providing an 
essential public service. It is also important to note that Colorado and Vermont, 
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like Utah both have an Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. In Colorado and Vermont, 
such Releases are not enforceable as a matter of law because they are ambiguous 
as to what hazards are included and they violate public policy. The Colorado and 
Vermont Courts noted that their respective Inherent Risks of Skiing Statutes 
determine both the scope of the ski resort's immunity from suit and its 
responsibility to patrons. Hence, Releases for future injuries violated that public 
policy and are, therefore, unenforceable. The same would be true for the Releases 
at issue in the instant case pursuant to the Utah Inherent Risk of Skiing Act 
STATES WITH A STRONG PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE SKI INDUSTRY 
CONSIDER SIMILAR RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS TO 
BE VOID ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
In making a decision as to the legality of the exculpatory agreements 
between Rothstein and Snowbird, this Court must consider (1) whether the 
agreements are clear and understandable in expressing the intentions of the parties 
and (2) whether the agreements violate public policy. The existence of either one 
of the foregoing elements is sufficient to make a Release for future negligence 
unenforceable or void and both exist in this instance. 
A. Clear Expression of Intent. The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah has stated Utah law to be "exculpatory agreements are binding so 
long as they are clear and unequivocal in expressing the parties' agreement to 
absolve the defendant of liability." Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., Ltd., 839 
10 
F Supp. 789, ; 93 (I) ! II \ il 1 1/993) I lowever, whether i l :^. . ;.; uuset 
speak m tcniio ui injuries J I damages arising from "risk of skiing."" the risk 
associated with the operation ol a >.ki j i u . and the general "risk caused b> the 
negligence ol ^i">"hnil I b< 'IV/C<MV*> \n\ nnllMiiy ilmnl iln \ "i4i posed h\ a 
snow-covered man-made retaining wall constructed on a ski run. 
The United States District Court for T Jtah has also held that "assumption of 
r i s k
 ( ; M U ' L . ' i < * - ; - v- ^t i -
im y nX4 feith.i; Mikkelsun v. 1 labium, /64 P.2d 1584, 1388 (Utah * — , , . „ , , . 
"I he wall that Roth stein hit was not a known danger connected with skiing, nor 
does the general language -I i t ic^ /u leases encompas, ina; danger, K JIII: ;, n. 
"
s
 - -'~. - I t - ! • • - • l : . • *' •- o b i : H . * 
such a risk w as not clearly stated in the Releases. 
B The Releases Violate Public Policy. I he I Jtah Supreme Court has 
IIIIKII adopted ,i \! unlaid I'm iletn'iiiiiimi' P lirllii i llieir i>, a > lioii).', public inh h si in 
the provision of ski services. But there is a standard that has been adopted by 
other states in evaluating public interest See Tunklv Regents of University of 
< alijontia^ 4K \ V J"d 44 I I 14(1 \t 1% 11 lunkl Imlils llial • iRi : iea si ? ft: >r fi il i n e 
Iiniji ii y Is iixv alid if it show s some or all of the following: 
i i 
[1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought 
suitable for public regulation. 
[2] The parties seeking exculpation is forming a service of 
great importance to the public, which is often a matter 
of practical necessity for some members of the public. 
[3] The party hold itself out as willing to perform this 
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or 
at least for any member coming within certain 
established standards. 
[4] As a result of the essential nature of the service, and 
the economic setting of the transaction, the party 
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage 
of bargaining strength against any member of the 
public who seeks [the party's] service. 
[5] In exercising its superior bargaining power, the party 
confronts the public with a standardized adhesion 
contract of exculpation and makes no provision 
whereby the purchaser may pay additional reasonable 
fees and obtain protection against negligence. 
[6] Finally, a result of the transaction, the personal 
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of 
the seller subject to the risk of carelessness by the 
seller [the seller's agents]. 
Id. at 445-446 (footnotes omitted). Rothstein submits that all six of the foregoing 
elements to invalidate the Releases exist in this instance. 
To begin with, the ski industry is suitable for public regulation as is 
evidence by the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act which specifically provides: 
12 
I lie Legislature hnJ.. . • 'mg i> piaeineu n; i ^,vi <. 
number of residents oi . ^ aiid attracts a large number oi 
nonresidents sjonifn nniK . ontributing to the economy of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78~27~" I That finding \\^ \\V% me< • 'he first three elements of 
the Tunkl test 
' I lie foil u 1:1: i ai id fiftl i elei i lents of tl le 7 wn&/test ai e clearl} met b> the fact 
that all local ski areas apparently impose a similar liability provision as a condition 
fur season's pasv,> Finally, with respect to the unmarked snow-covered relamm? 
AV.. ._ KoiiL^u i s i. \> ei e c leai 1;> si lbject to Sno ' :" > bh d' s conti • :)1 
Many states have enacted a statute similar to "Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing 
4rL The Vermont equi\ aieui of Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act provides as 
follows: 
Nu'iwiUiNidnaihL. Lue puAi:>ioih oi section io w» ol this title, a person -*ho 
lakes pari in an\ sport accepts as a matter of law the dangers that inlieie 
therein insofar as they are obvious and neccssat \ . 
12 V.S.A §1037 (1978). Based upon thai /h /, lU, supreme Court, of Vermont has 
releasing defendants from all liability resulting from negligence are \ nit? 
eontran to public policv " Dahrrvv SKI fv7 *™ A .2d 795, 
seriously injured when he collided with a metal pole that formed part of the 
control maze for a ski lift line. Before ihe ski season started, Dalury purchased a 
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season pass and signed a form releasing the ski area from all liability. The 
Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the 
exculpatory agreements, which released defendants from all liability, were valid. 
The Supreme Court of Vermont explicitly overruled the Superior Court, stating 
that the exculpatory agreements were void as contrary to public policy. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected 
defendants' argument that ski resorts do not provide an essential public service. 
The Court reasoned, "the defendants' area is a facility open to the public. They 
advertise and invite skiers and nonskiers of every level of skiing ability to their 
premises for the price of a ticket." Id. at 799. "Each ticket sale may be, for some 
purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such 
sales take place as a result of the seller's general invitation to the public to utilize 
the facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises." Id. The 
Court held that the defendant ski resort was in a better position to guard and insure 
against risks. The Court stated that 
[t]he policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land 
on those who own or control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents 
to the minimum level possible. Defendants, not recreational skiers, have 
the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to guard 
against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can 
properly maintain and inspect their premises, and train their employees in 
risk management. They alone can insure against risks and effectively 
spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, 
14 
ontheothei Hand, aic noi m a pi . isu-\a anu u u i u ' I'M*- > 
harm, ar J , ! \" -•nv*-*t ;<w..r,.
 ;uv, . ... a^v-f^ n.oijupn; = 
i d. 
Finally,, the Court rejected defendants' argument that the public policy of 
the state, as expressed In tl l e li;""i:", it x 'eptanc 't " of J nhe rei it Ri sks ' stati ite,, 1 2 V S V. 
§103" . • . • willingness on the part of the Legislature to limit ski area 
liability. The defendants argued that public polie\ favors the use of express 
releases such as the one signer i-*
 ruunhi; \u uourt rejv,\^w .;us argument 
I'mUiit^  '\iefei . ; -r *M.I ? - ivuv" -K^V- r -v with 
the statute. The statute places responsibilit) lor the inherent risks' oI an\ ii-^non 
the part.icipa.nt, insofar as si ich risks are obvious and necessary." ' 1 < / at 800 
risk nui an obvious and necessary one in the sport of skiing. 1 hu^ a okiei \> 
assumption * THK, inherent risks of skiing does no( abrogate the ski area's dntv ' v 
warn, of or correct dangers which in the exercise of reasonable pi udence in the 
cii ci imsta nces coi lid have been foreseen and corrected."" Id. (citations omitted). 
I\ 1uch like Utah 's Inherent Risk of 'Skiing statute, the Vermont statute 
protects ski resorts from llabil.it> based, on the inherent risk,. ,.; .hnng, but does nol 
go so far as to protect them from tl leir ow n negligei ice 1 1 le Vermont coi ti ts 
refused to allow the ski resorts "to undermine the public policy underlying 
is 
business invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to 
control." Id. at 799. The same should be true for Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing 
statute. Since, like the Vermont Legislature, the Utah legislature has clearly 
allocated the duties of skiers and ski area operators. In the floor debates on Utah's 
Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Senate Bill 146, the sponsor of that bill, Senator 
Finlinson, expressly stated the purpose of this bill was to reduce the liability of ski 
area operators and regulate the relationship between skiers and ski area operators. 
Senator Finlinson said, "this kind of law does not prohibit the individual from 
being successful or successfully bringing a claim against the operator if the 
operator was, in fact, negligent.. ." Senator Finlinson went on to say that this law 
imposed upon ski resorts the responsibility to operate in "a non-negligent 
manner." Afternoon Session of the Utah State Senate General Session of 1979, 
Day 40, February 16, 1979, Audograph Disc 184 & 185, Track 2 at 4 minutes. 
The legislative history of the floor debates continued and Senator Finlinson 
explained that, "the main thrust of Senate Bill 146 is to clarify the Utah law so that 
the skier assumes the responsibility for the inherent risks of skiing. The ski areas 
still have the responsibility for making sure ... they don't operate in a negligent 
manner." Morning Session of the Utah State Senate General Session of 1979, Day 
43, February 19, 1979, Audograph Disc 186 & 187, Track 6 at 3 minutes 50 
seconds. Given this express intent on the part of the Utah Legislature to allocate 
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responsibility for the operation of ski areas, it would violate p, . . . 
ski area opei atoi s to " * • a/h - e their responsibilities 1 11 iile i this stati ite by a separate 
private release. 
Colorado's equivalent of the I Jtah Inherent Risk of Skiing statute reads as 
t in. general assenihK herebx finds and declares thai it is in the mleic-, oi 
the stale oft 'ulorad* to establish reasonable safet) standards for ihc 
operation of ski areas and lot the skiers using iheni. Realizing the dangers 
that inhere in the sport of skiing, regardless 01 an> and all reasonable .afetv 
^p^snres which can be employed, the purpose of this article is to 
supplement the passenger tramwav safety provisions of pari 7 of art n 
title 25, C.R.S.: to further define the legal responsibilities of ski area 
operators and their agents and employees: to define the responsibility > of 
skiers using such ski areas: and ?-. define die :^ ghi-- :r-d h jhilities existing 
Klnnj i die skier and the ski aiea operator and between skiers 
C .R .S., L §33. 1 1 • 2 
As used in this article, unless 'the context otherwise requires: 
(3.5) "Inherent dangers and risks of skiing" means those dangers or 
conditions that are part of the sport of skiing, including changing weather 
conditions; snow conditions as they exist or may change, such as ice, hard 
pack, powder, packed powder, wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, 
and machine-made snow: surface or subsurface conditions such as haie 
spots, forest urown roeks, slumps, streambeds. ehiK extreme lerraih and 
trees. - >iher natural objects, and collisions with ^u », \) nural objeU 
•••." \* nli ! U towers, signs, posts, fences or enclosures. Imtrants. water 
pipes, or other man-made structures and their components: \ anatiosv •-> 
steepness or terrain, whether natural or as a result of slope design, 
snowmaking or grooming operations, including but not limited to roads, 
freestvle terrain, jumps, and catwalks or other terrain modifications; 
collision*- w nh other skiers: and :he failure of skiers to ski within their own 
abilities ' in- ten- * nhcrent dangers and risks of skiing" does not include 
1 7 
the negligence of a ski area operator as set forth in section 33-44-104(2). 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the liability of the ski area 
operator for injury caused by the use or operation of ski lifts. 
C.R.S.A. § 33-44-103. In Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., 668 P.2d 982 
(Colo. App. 1983), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a private agreement 
could not modify the Colorado Ski Safety Act's express allocation of the duties of 
skiers and ski area operators. 668 P.2d 982. 
The Colorado Court held that the operator's failure to warn the plaintiff of 
heavy equipment on the slope was negligence under the statute and that, based on 
the public policy announced by the legislature, liability for negligence based on a 
violation of the express terms of the statute could not be waived by a private 
agreement. The Court held, "[statutory provisions may not be modified by 
private agreement if doing so would violate the public policy expressed in the 
statute. The statutes at issue here allocate the parties' respective duties with regard 
to safety of those around them, and the trial court correctly excluded a purported 
agreement intended to alter those duties." Id. at 987. 
Again, similar to Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, Colorado has a statute 
that clearly allocates the duties of skiers and ski area operators. The Colorado 
legislature, like the Utah legislature, intended that skiers would assume risks 
inherent in the sport of skiing, but did not intend to preclude skiers from bringing 
an action based on the ski area operator's negligence. The Colorado Court of 
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\ ppeals was not willing to uphold a pi ivate agreement intended to a U i ;f iese 
e: ;:pi: ess stati itoi ;; > di ities. ai id tl lis Cc i n I: si lj illlj :| "l » *i |,:*11 1 Ihi "!| 
iii Hanks v. Powder Ridge, 888 A.2d J J O
 v t o m i . 2uU^)9 the Connecticut 
Supreme Court: w as guided by the Tunkl factors and found that an exculpatory 
agreement signed by snowtubing patron, . K M - r 
personal inji iries iriei irred as a result of their own neo licence was invalid as against 
puhlit no lie; * he Court stated "[t]he law docs nut l.^'»r - * -r.inu l provision* 
wind* rchcve a person fi,-^. .»> , own negligence .. ^..a.^-r^ om:;: . t„ 
" I h is is becai lse e •. " •• -j Wat*.." 
governing our tort sys tem/ Id. 1 h e Court reasoned liiat [I .IIC concern^ 
expressed by the court in Dalury are equally applicable to "the context of 
iiiunliibifig, ..Hid we agiee ili.il il r illogical lo pciim! >IHM lube is. and ihc |iubhr 
generally, to bear the costs of risks that they hav e no ability or right to control." 
Id. at 745, The Coi irt concluded that the agreement at Ksm in Hanks violated 
pi lblicpolicy, not solely because ol the volume ol public p.iMh, ipali«»u„ (nil because 
.• ^ i.u!-1 - ! d* -- •'i - ' - 'defendants invite the public generally to 
their lacility; defendants, not recreational snowtubers, have the knowledge, 
experience and authority to maintain the snowtubing runs in reasonably safe 
i iiiidiliwn iiitJ t d.ihi! ii(i?jiri-J (hi ncyl igeme of it i m|ilii>\v, tlii d< hndanfs I U T C 
in a better position to insure against the risk of their negligence and to spread the 
costs of insurance to their patrons; that if they upheld the agreement, defendants 
would be permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability and the incentive for 
them to maintain a reasonably safe snowtubing environment would be removed, 
with the public bearing the cost; and the fact that the defendants had superior 
bargaining power. All of these factors that the Connecticut Supreme Court used to 
determine that the agreement at issue in Hanks violated public policy are present 
in this case and this Court should hold also that the Releases at issue violate public 
policy. 
In an analogous case, the New Mexico Court applied these six standards of 
Tunkl to an exculpatory release agreement and found it to be unenforceable as a 
matter of policy. See Berlangier v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003). 
Berlangier was a case in which the defendant operated a recreational resort in 
New Mexico which offered recreational activities such as fishing, horseback 
riding, hiking, etc. As a requirement for participating in the resort's activities, 
such as horseback riding, guests were required to sign a release. Plaintiff was 
seriously injured while horseback riding. The issue before the New Mexico 
Supreme Court was whether the release violated public policy so as not to be 
enforceable and the Berlangier court concluded that it did. The Berlangier court 
noted that public policy disallowing a release can be furnished either through 
statutory common law. A turning point on public policy in the Berlangier case 
was the New Mexico's "Equine Liability Act, N.M.S.A. 1978 § 42-13-4 (1993)." 
This law, which is similar to the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act in Utah, provided in 
pertinent part as follows: 
A. No person, corporation or partnership is liable for personal injuries 
to or for the death of a rider that may occur as a result of the behavior of 
equine animals while engaged in any equine activities. 
B. No person, corporation or partnership shall make any claim against, 
maintain any action against or recover from a rider, operator, owner, trainer 
or promoter for injury, loss or damage resulting from equine behavior 
unless the acts or omissions of the rider, owner, operator, trainer or 
promoter constitute negligence. 
C. Nothing in the Equine Liability Act shall be construed to prevent or 
limit the liability of the operator, owner, trainer or promoter of an equine 
activity who: 
(1) provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have 
known that the equipment or tack was faulty and an injury was the 
proximate result of the faulty condition of the equipment or tack; 
(2) provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and 
prudent efforts to determine the ability of the rider to: 
(a) engage safely in the equine activity; or 
(b) safely manage the particular equine based on the rider's 
representations of his ability; 
(3) owns, leases, rents or otherwise is in lawful possession and 
control of the land or facilities upon which a rider sustained injuries 
because of a dangerous condition that was known to the operator, 
owner, trainer or promoter of the equine activity; 
(4) committed an act or omission that constitutes conscious or 
reckless disregard for the safety of a rider and an injury was the 
proximate result of that act or omission; or 
(5) intentionally injures a rider. 
N.M.S.A. 1978 § 42-13-4 (1993). Simply put, the New Mexico Equine Liability 
Act precluded anyone injured while horseback riding from suing for injuries was 
attributable to the behavior of the horse, but did allow injured persons to sue 
equine operators on other grounds, including their negligence involving those risks 
not inherent to horseback riding. The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that 
this Statute expressed a public policy that equine operators should be accountable 
for their own negligence when the injury did not involve the behavior of the 
animal. (Id. at p. 111.) The Court noted that this public policy existed because it 
expressed what activities the equine operator would be liable for and those for 
which he/she/it would not be liable. The same is true for the Utah Inherent Risk of 
Skiing Act. 
The existence of risk allocating loss such as Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing 
Act are very important because appellate courts consistently hold that such laws 
apportioning responsibility for injuries between resort operators and patrons 
constitute public policy that overrides Release and Indemnity Agreements. 
Finally, within the context of the Colorado recreational skiing industry, the 
Tenth Circuit has stated that these Release and Indemnity Agreements are adhesion 
contracts. See Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117, 1123 (10 
Cir. 1978). And that is another reason for not enforcing the Releases at issue in 
the instant case since every ski resort in Salt Lake County requires patrons to 
execute such an agreement in order to obtain a season pass. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse or vacate the District Court's summary judgment 
and instruct the District Court to submit the case to a jury for further findings at a 
trial in this matter. 
DATED this of June, 2006. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
sse C. Trentadue 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT A 
FILEO OlSTiiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 3 2006 
SALTIAKF rn i iMTY 
By 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
WILLIAM ROTHSTEIN, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
v. 
SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. Civil No. 040925852 
Judge Anthony Qumn 
On December 13, 2005, this Court heard oral argument on (1) defendant Snowbird's 
Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: 
defendant's Eighth Affirmative Defense; (3) plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Request ("Motion") for 
(Continuance; and (4) plaintiffs Motion to Amend. A separate Order will be entered concerning 
plaintiffs Motion to Amend as directed by this Court. 
Although fully briefed, the Court determined that it was unnecessary at this time to rule 
(in plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: the Inherent Risk of Slamg Act 
Affirmative Defense.. 
Exhibit A 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. of Suitrer Axland appeared on behalf of plaintiff Rothstem. 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. and Kevin J Simon, Esq. of Strachan & Strachan, P.C., appeared on 
behalf of defendant Snowbird. 
WHEREFORE, after reviewing the court papers submitted by plaintiff Rothstem and 
defendant Snowbird and hearing the arguments presented at the December 13,2005 Hearings this 
Court hereby ORDERS, DECREES, and ADJUDGES as follows: 
1. Defendant Snowbird's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding plaintiffs 
ordinary negligence claim is GRANTED and plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment regarding defendant's Eighth Affirmative Defense is DENIED Plaintiffs ordinary 
negligence claim is, thus, dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Request (or "Motion") for Continuance is DENIED. 
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of U j l f ^ - ^ 200_(^ 
BY ORDER OF THIS COURT: 
The Honorable Antllony Quinn 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
Kevin J. Simon 
Attorneys for defendant Snowbird 
SUITTER AXLAND 
Sse Trentadue 
(Attorneys for plaintiff Rothstem 
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